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1. INTRODUCTION
The protest movement against the Arab authoritarian regimes, which started in 
Tunisia in December 2010, quickly spread to other Arab countries: Egypt, Yem-
en, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria. Indirectly, it affected other countries in the region. 
It raised big hopes for more freedom and democracy, and the speeding up of 
the economic and social modernisation of the region long marred by autocratic 
regimes, remnants of feudalism, slow growth, and extreme income and wealth 
inequalities. 
Sadly, five years later (March 2016), these hopes failed to materialise. In most 
cases, the collapse of the previous dictatorships has not led to establishing vi-
able democratic regimes able to ensure an elementary political stability and a re-
sponsible economic management. On the contrary, most of the countries directly 
affected by the mass protests have suffered from increasing domestic political, 
economic and social instability and insecurity. The originally peaceful protests 
gradually degenerated into bloody conflicts fuelled by sectarian, ethnic, tribal, or 
regional animosities. As a result, the entire region has suffered, in economic and 
security terms, from civil wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen. In 2015–2016, 
the consequences of these conflicts also reached Europe via the large-scale influx 
of refugees, and the terrorist attacks organised by the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) and other extreme organisations. Tunisia is the only tentative success 
story in conducting democratic reforms, although not free from terrorist threats 
and numerous economic and social challenges. 
From the beginning of the protest movement, the question emerged on how to 
successfully manage a political and economic transition and the kind of experi-
ence which could be useful for Arab countries. This question remained even more 
important five years later when initial hopes for quick success had disappeared. 
In 2011–2012, many experts pointed to potential similarities between the 
Arab and post-communist transitions (e.g., Basora 2011). Some advised the new 
Arab governments to learn directly from post-communist experience of the early 
1990s. In particular, the governments and emerging aid industry in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) believed in the relevance of their transition experience 
for emerging Arab democracies.1 Others expressed more nuanced opinions, pre-
senting both similarities and differences between the post-communist and Arab 
transitions (Meyersson et al. 2011; Slay 2011; Rohac 2012). 
In 2016, the differences between both transition trajectories became even more 
evident. That is, the relevance of the post-communist experience for Arab coun-
1  See Mikulova – Berti (2013) for an interesting overview of CEE advisory and experience-
sharing effort.
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tries and reform advice based on that experience can only be partial. The lessons 
drawn from other developing countries’ paths to democracy and open market 
economy can perhaps be of equal or even higher value. Nevertheless, learning 
from the experiences (both positive and negative) of CEE and the former Soviet 
Union (FSU) may still be useful, especially if the differences between the regions 
are not forgotten. 
Neither can one exclude sharing experience in the opposite direction. The dra-
matic five-year history of the Arab transition may serve as an instructive example 
for those post-communist countries which have not completed their transition to 
democracy yet and face difficulties in building a domestic political consensus, 
suffer from unresolved ethnic, sectarian and territorial conflicts, display the in-
ability to pursue responsible economic policies. 
The purpose of this paper is to conduct a comparative empirical analysis of 
major similarities and differences in the political and socio-economic transition 
in both regions, suggest areas of potential experience sharing, and common les-
sons. Our main argument is that despite some similarities in initial conditions, 
especially in the political sphere, there are enough differences – historical, insti-
tutional, cultural, and other – to justify a sceptical attitude to a direct “wholesale” 
transfer of the post-communist transition experience to the Arab world. Neverthe-
less, some experience sharing makes sense and common lessons from both transi-
tions can be drawn for the benefit of future reform attempts. 
The empirical character of our analysis means that we do not intend to con-
tribute to the theory of political and economic transition. Nor are we going to 
relaunch a normative debate on an optimal transition strategy in CEE and FSU, 
which preoccupied many authors in the 1990s and early 2000s.2 
The paper’s structure is as follows: Section 2 discusses the process of political 
transition, followed by Section 3 on economic transition, and Section 4 on long-
term development challenges. Section 5 presents common lessons and potentials 
for experience sharing between the two regions.
In geographical terms, our analysis covers 29 post-communist countries of 
the CEE/FSU region and 22 member countries of the Arab League. Marginally, 
in Section 2, it also deals with the occupied and disputed territories in both re-
gions. The cross-regional comparative format of our analysis leaves no room for 
individual country stories other than the exemplification of general trends or an 
indication of major exceptions from those trends. 
The statistical data come from the IMF, the World Bank, other international 
databases and rankings, and the findings of other research projects and publica-
tions. 
2  For the overview of this debate, see World Bank (2002).
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2. POLITICAL TRANSITION
2.1. The legacy of dictatorship
From a historical perspective, the similarities between Arab countries before 2010 
and former communist countries before 1989 seem compelling. The hegemony of 
one political party controlled by a dictator or ruler and his entourage meant a lack 
of democracy and political pluralism, manipulated election processes, the politi-
cal dependence of the judiciary, the excessive power of the army, security agen-
cies and police, censorship and tight administrative control of grass-roots citizen 
initiatives, massive violations of human rights, and the organised repression of 
certain social, political, ethnic or sectarian groups. 
However, similar characteristics have applied, to varying degrees, to authori-
tarian regimes outside the former communist bloc and the Arab region – in Asia, 
Africa, Latin America, or Europe (before the WWII). In this respect, neither the 
communist system nor the Arab authoritarian regimes have been unique. 
Nevertheless, when the political transition started, the countries and societies 
in both regions had to deal with similar legacies of authoritarianism. They includ-
ed a lack of tradition or only very distant memories of democratic government, 
the absence of the institutions of liberal democracy and effective legal guarantees 
of civil rights and liberties, the systemic checks and balances between individual 
branches of government (including an independent judiciary), the rule of law, the 
culture of free speech, democratic public discourse, and tolerance for ethnic, re-
ligious, sexual, and other minorities, etc. All these components of contemporary 
liberal democracy had to be built from the scratch, often by learning from other 
countries’ experience and importing their institutions. 
In this effort, CEE countries (including the Baltic ones) found themselves in a 
privileged position. They (i) possessed some memories of the rule of law, politi-
cal pluralism and other democratic institutions (from the interwar or even early 
post-World War II period), (ii) enjoyed close geographical and cultural ties with 
Western Europe, and (iii) became eligible to apply for membership in the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Both the 
EU and NATO set high membership criteria in respect to civil rights and liberties, 
and democratic institutions.3 
FSU countries, especially in Central Asia, were in a less advantageous position 
compared to the CEE. However, they could refer, at least partly, to some modern 
3  Among others, NATO accession requires prior resolution of territorial disputes with neigh-
bours and ethnic conflicts and ensuring the effective civilian control over the armed forces 
(see Section 2.4). 
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(i.e. post-feudal) political and legal institutions of the Russian empire (before the 
Bolshevik revolution), contemporary democratic institutions of other European 
countries, and draw from institutional standards offered to them by the Council of 
Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
Arab countries cannot rely on even such weak historical and external anchors. 
Most of them inherited a social and institutional legacy of the Ottoman Empire 
and, in some cases, were influenced by the institutions of colonial powers (e.g. 
the French cultural and, partly, institutional influence in the Maghreb region). 
The latter, for obvious reasons, have limited appeal to the Arab societies. 
2.2. Mixed results of the political transition in CEE/FSU
Looking at the potential lessons of the post-communist political transition for 
the Arab region, one must start from the pessimistic observation that the former 
proved only partly successful. Among the 29 countries of CEE and FSU, one 
can distinguish three groups depending on the results of the political transition 
(Dabrowski 2013): 
1.  Countries which democratised their political systems in the early 1990s and 
sustained a democratic regime until now; this group includes the countries that 
joined the EU in 2004 and 2007.
2.  Countries of the Western Balkans region, which recorded limited progress in 
democratisation in the 1990s, but substantially improved their performance in 
the next decade after resolving a large part of their ethnic and territorial con-
flicts and overthrowing authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes. Here, the 
prospects of joining the EU also played a mobilising role.
3.  Most of the FSU countries which, after the short period of political freedom 
and democracy in the early 1990s, moved back towards authoritarian or semi-
authoritarian regimes. 
In the third group, one could notice several spontaneous social protests against 
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes: the “Rose” Revolution in Georgia 
in 2003, the “Orange” Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, and the “Tulip” Revolu-
tion in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. However, the results of these revolutions became 
largely mismanaged by post-revolutionary political elites, perhaps with the ex-
ception of Georgia, which seemed to accomplish some sustainable, although lim-
ited progress on its way to liberal democracy. The social disappointment and 
renewed authoritarian trends led to the new “revolutions” in Kyrgyzstan (2011) 
and Ukraine (the so-called Euro-Maidan Revolution or Revolution of Dignity in 
2013–2014). 
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Occasionally, anti-authoritarian protests have also been noted in Belarus, Rus-
sia (2011–2012), Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan (2005), but these never 
attained the sufficient “critical mass” to guarantee democratic evolution. 
2.3. The Arab Uprising
The mass protest movement in the Arab world started from Tunisia in December 
2010, whence it quickly spread to other Arab countries: Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain , 
Libya, and Syria. Most frequently, it has been called the “Arab Spring”, some-
times also the “Arab Uprising”, “Arab Awakening” (Khouri 2011), or “Arab 
Revolution”. We prefer to speak about “protest movement”, “Arab transition”, 
and “Arab Uprising” rather than “Arab Spring” for two reasons: (1) The analysed 
events were not limited to spring 2011, to which the term “Arab Spring” origi-
nally referred to; (2) In the metaphoric sense, it suggests an optimistic scenario, 
a change for the better, which has failed to materialise so far.
The protest movement has mostly affected the secular republican regimes that 
emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, as a result of either military coups or anti-coloni-
al resistance (Mallat – Mortimer 2016). At least in their early stages, they tried to 
refer to some sort of socialist ideology termed Arab socialism and enjoyed the po-
litical, economic, and military backing of the former Soviet Union. This political 
characteristic applied to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, Syria and Iraq (where the 
regime change followed the US-led military intervention of 2003), and Sudan and 
Algeria (neither of which have yet been affected by large-scale political unrest).4 
The political protest movement has affected the Arab monarchies to a lesser 
extent so far. Most of them have followed conservative ideologies and policies. 
Among them, only Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Kuwait experienced social 
unrest in 2011–2012. In Bahrain, the government pacified the protest movement 
called the “Pearl” Revolution with the support of Saudi troops. In Jordan, Moroc-
co, and Kuwait, the protests led to changes in the government and partial political 
reforms (or a promise to that effect). 
In early 2016, five years after the beginning of the protest movements, the 
situation falls short of early hopes. Although mass revolts led to the overthrow 
of former authoritarian rulers in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, only Tunisia 
4  One must remember, however, that Algeria experienced an unsuccessful attempt of democra-
tisation in the early 1990s, followed by an almost decade-long civil war (see, e.g., Martinez – 
Entelis 2000). In early 2016, its political, social, and economic situation remained precarious 
due to external instability (Libya and Mali), uncertainty related to political succession after 
the aging President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and the consequences of dramatic oil price decline 
in 2014–2015 (Lebovich 2015; Fakir – Ghanem-Yazbeck 2016). 
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continues the process of building democratic order. On January 26, 2014, its Na-
tional Assembly approved a new constitution (Al Jazeera 2014), which offered a 
chance to complete the political transition from dictatorship to liberal democracy. 
Despite a series of terrorist attacks in 2015, Tunisia has managed to sustain a rela-
tive internal stability and democratic form of government. In 2013, it also started 
to implement the economic reform program supported by the IMF Stand-by loan, 
albeit with insufficient speed and consequence (IMF 2015b). 
The situation in other countries looks much worse. Egypt, the second county 
after Tunisia where the protest movement won in February 2011, enjoyed a short 
period of political freedom and unstable democracy, which ended with a military 
coup in July 2013 and the restoration of an authoritarian regime backed by the 
Egyptian army. 
In Libya and Yemen, the 2011 mass protests succeeded in bringing down old 
authoritarian regimes. However, they failed to build democracy and elementary 
political stability, and both countries became the failed states in 2014–2015 (see 
Wehrey 2016 on Libya). Due to deep splits of their societies along sectarian, 
regional, ideological, tribal, and cultural lines, they slipped into civil wars. In 
Yemen, the foreign interference has additionally fuelled an ethnic and sectar-
ian conflict. The Saudi Arabia-led coalition of Gulf countries, which enjoys the 
military backing of the US, tries to reinstall the government of President Abd 
Rabbuh Mansour Hadi elected in 2012 against the Houthi rebels backed by Iran 
(ECFR 2015). 
Similar general characteristics apply to Iraq, which started its political transi-
tion in 2003. But, after a period of relative political stability based on a demo-
cratic constitution between 2008 and 2012, it slipped again into a civil war with 
ISIS fuelled by the Sunni–Shia conflict. 
Syria, another country affected by the protest events of 2011, represents the 
most tragic case. The reluctance of President Bashar al-Assad to accept any po-
litical change and his violent crackdown on protesters, plus the involvement of 
external players (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Russia, and others), led to a 
full-scale bloody civil war with no prospects of fast resolution. In early 2016, the 
country remains territorially divided between pro-government forces and Sunni 
rebels of various ethnic, ideological, and political profiles (including ISIS whose 
territorial holding increased in 2014–2015).
Civil wars in Syria and Iraq pose a destabilisation threat, in political and eco-
nomic terms (see Section 3.3) for neighbouring Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The 
civil war in Libya can easily spread over to Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, or the Sahel 
countries. In 2015–2016, the consequences of political instability and civil wars 
in the Arab region spread to Europe via the record-high number of refugees and 
the wave of terrorist attacks in France and Belgium organised by ISIS.
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2.4. Comparison of the political systems in CEE/FSU and the Arab countries
To assess progress in political reforms in the CEE/FSU region and the Arab coun-
tries, we use the Freedom House (FH) rating “Freedom in the World (FIW)”. 
Each country in Table 1 is evaluated by two criteria: political rights (PR), and 
civil liberties (CL), both measured on a scale of 1–7, with 1 representing the high-
est degree of freedom and 7 the lowest. 
The picture, which arises, is gloomy for the Arab region (see also Devarajan 
2016) and only partly positive for the CEE/FSU region. There is only one political-
ly free Arab country, namely Tunisia (since the 2015 ranking; before, it was rated 
as “partly free”). Four others are ranked as “partly free”: Comoros, Kuwait, Leba-
non, and Morocco. The FH FIW ranking reports several deteriorations, including 
countries directly affected by the Arab transition, namely Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, 
and Yemen. Most of their 2011–2012 freedom and democratic gains were reversed 
in 2013–2015. Deteriorations also affected Iraq, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip.
In the CEE/FSU region, the situation is highly polarised, with three subgroups 
of countries as analysed in Section 2.2. However, the deterioration of scores in 
2014–2015 affected representatives of each subgroup – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan 
and Russia in the FSU, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia in the Western 
Balkans, and Hungary in the CEE. On the other hand, Kosovo and Ukraine were 
given a rating upgrade. 
Two FSU countries (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and four Arab countries 
(Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria) are rated as the “Worst of the Worst”, 
with the lowest possible ranking (7) in both the PR and CL categories. 
Interestingly, the FIW rating also includes non-sovereign, occupied, and dis-
puted territories – five in the FSU and three in the Arab world. In three cases 
(Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Somaliland), they are rated as “partly free”, 
while the others belong to the “non-free” category. The worst situation concerns 
the Gaza Strip, South Ossetia, and the Crimea (after its annexation by Russia in 
2014). 
An important observation relates to the form of political regime. All CEE coun-
tries, which record sustainable progress in building liberal democracy, represent 
either a parliamentary or a parliamentary-presidential form of government. The 
same holds true for those countries in the FSU region, which avoided the full-
scale authoritarian trap (Moldova, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine). Looking 
outside the FSU/CEE region, the experiences of several Latin American, Asian, 
and African countries confirm that a presidential form of government is prone to 
authoritarian degeneration, especially in the environment of weak legal institu-
tions and civil society. 
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Table 1. Freedom in the World scores, 2015, CEE/FSU and Arab countries
CEE/FSU PR CL Status Change Arab countries PR CL Status Change
Albania 3 3 PF Algeria 6 5 NF
Armenia 5 4 PF Bahrain 7 6 NF ↓
Azerbaijan 6 6 NF ↓ Comoros 3 4 PF
Belarus 7 6 NF Djibouti 6 5 NF
Bosnia & Herzegovina 4 3 PF ↓ Egypt 6 5 NF ↓
Bulgaria 2 2 F Iraq 6 6 NF ↓
Croatia 1 2 F Jordan 6 5 NF
Czech Republic 1 1 F Kuwait 5 5 PF
Estonia 1 1 F Lebanon 5 4 PF ↓
Georgia 3 3 PF Libya 6 6 NF ↓
Hungary 2 2 F ↓ Mauritania 6 5 NF
Kazakhstan 6 5 NF ↓ Morocco 5 4 PF
Kosovo 4 4 PF ↑ Oman 6 5 NF
Kyrgyzstan 5 5 PF Qatar 6 5 NF
Latvia 2 2 F Saudi Arabia 7 7 NF
Lithuania 1 1 F Somalia 7 7 NF
Macedonia 4 3 PF ↓ Sudan 7 7 NF
Moldova 3 3 PF Syria 7 7 NF
Montenegro 3 2 F Tunisia 1 3 PF ↑
Poland 1 1 F UAE 6 6 NF
Romania 2 2 F Yemen 6 6 NF ↓
Russia 6 6 NF ↓ Gaza Strip 7 6 NF ↓
Serbia 2 2 F West Bank 6 5 NF
Slovakia 1 1 F Somaliland 4 5 PF
Slovenia 1 1 F
Tajikistan 6 6 NF
Turkmenistan 7 7 NF
Ukraine 3 3 PF ↑
Uzbekistan 7 7 NF
Abkhazia 4 5 PF
Crimea 7 6 NF
Nagorno-Karabakh 5 5 PF
South Ossetia 7 6 NF
Transnistria 6 6 NF
Notes: PR – political rights, CL – civil liberties, NF – non-free, PF – partly free, F – free, ↓ – deterioration, ↑ – 
improvement (both in 2014–2015 rankings); Italics denote non-sovereign, occupied and disputed territories. 
Source: Freedom in the World, http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202014%20Scores%20-%20
Countries%20and%20Territories.pdf
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In this context, the choice of the parliamentary-presidential regime in the new 
Tunisian constitution, approved on January 26, 2014, is a promising sign (which 
has been confirmed by the country’s upgrade in the 2015 FIW rating). Conse-
quently, one of the basic political recommendations for both the Arab and FSU 
countries should be developing a parliamentary form of government based on a 
strong system of constitutional checks and balances. 
Another conclusion concerns ensuring an effective civilian control over army 
and security agencies by the democratically elected government and parliament. 
Achieving such a goal often requires a sweeping reorganisation of both, redefining 
their constitutional and legal mandate, and sometimes their downsizing. The chal-
lenge of the excessive political and economic power of the military and security 
forces and institutions is faced by several FSU and Arab countries, for example, 
Russia, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Yemen. Besides those two regions, it remains a 
serious challenge in many Latin American, African, and Asian countries. 
3. ECONOMIC TRANSITION
3.1. Comparing Arab socialism and Soviet-type socialism
The unique features of the Soviet-type socialism related mostly to its socio-eco-
nomic model: the dominance of politics and ideology over economic rules, the far-
reaching centralisation of all key business decisions at a government level (a central 
planning system, also termed the command economy), the monopoly or dominance 
of the public ownership of productive assets, political nominations for managerial 
positions (nomenklatura), administrative pricing and wage setting (which led to 
chronic market shortages, rationing of both consumer goods and production sup-
plies, and often to a shortage of labour resources), currency inconvertibility and 
multiple exchange rates, state monopoly in foreign trade, government-driven in-
vestment processes based on a country’s self-sufficiency (autarchy) principle, so-
cially motivated full-employment and income-equalisation policies (which did not 
necessarily produce actual income equality), the heavy burden of military and secu-
rity spending, and the subordination of the economy to military and security goals. 
When we consider the experience of the so-called Arab socialism, especially 
in its early stages (from the 1950s to 1970s), we find several analogies to the 
Soviet model. Some Arab countries tried to emulate the Soviet experience of cen-
tral planning, especially with respect to investment processes driven by political 
considerations and import-substitution industrialisation strategies. In particular, 
oil-producing countries such as Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and, to a lesser extent, Syria, 
had the financial capacity to pursue such policies (the political, military, and eco-
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nomic support from the Soviet bloc also played an important role). Several coun-
tries, especially those involved in regional or internal conflicts, allocated a large 
share of their public expenditure to military and security programs. 
Price controls and large-scale subsidies, especially with respect to basic food 
and energy products, were also a common feature. The same holds true for cur-
rency inconvertibility and trade protectionism (but not a full state monopoly in 
foreign trade as in communist countries). 
The importance of public ownership in many Arab countries grew quite rap-
idly out of both outright nationalisation (especially of foreign-owned firms) and 
government investment programs. Similarly to communist countries, state-owned 
enterprises remained ineffective, overburdened by social employment and man-
aged by political nominees, many of whom were recruited from among retired 
military and security officers. Again, the presence of oil wealth created more 
financial leeway for such policies. 
Nevertheless, nationalisation policies never went as far as they did in the coun-
tries of the former Soviet bloc. The major sectors of the Arab economies such as 
agriculture, trade, services, and small- and medium-size manufacturing remained 
largely in private hands, even in the most “socialist” countries. Private ownership 
as such was never ideologically condemned and market institutions and legal 
infrastructure, even if less developed, remained largely in place, contrary to the 
practice in communist countries. 
Despite price controls, subsidies, and exchange and import controls, the inter-
nal price structure remained less distorted than, for example, in the former USSR, 
and the market shortage of basic consumer goods was less acute. Similarly, in 
spite of industrialisation driven by import-substitution and trade protectionism, 
the Arab economies largely avoided the massive structural distortions (and arti-
ficial over-industrialisation) that characterised the Soviet Union and CEE. The 
same goes for the stronger trade and cultural ties with the Western world. 
Furthermore, from the early 1980s (Egypt) and 1990s (Algeria and Tunisia), 
individual countries started, at least partially, to depart from economic dirigisme, 
with the active engagement of the IMF and the World Bank. This process was 
driven both by external factors (fall of oil prices in the mid-1980s, the collapse 
of the Soviet bloc, the economic reforms in China, India and other developing 
countries) and domestic policy needs (combating macroeconomic instability and 
the desire to avoid political unrest). In the first decade of the 2000s, even the most 
closed and statist countries such as Libya and Syria made their economic policies 
more flexible and started partial market reforms (Dabrowski – De Wulf 2013). 
However, these reforms, due to their limited agenda and rather slow pace of 
implementation, failed to produce the expected results. Economic growth, in 
particular, in per capita terms continued to be disappointing in the 1990s and ac-
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celerated only slightly in the 2000s, on top of high commodity prices and global 
emerging-market boom. Unemployment, especially of youths, remained high, 
and the same was true of income and wealth inequalities (Ghanem 2016a, b). 
The lack of democratic control and government transparency was not conducive 
to a fair privatisation or to implementing effective measures against corruption 
and nepotism (Devarajan 2016). As a result, the limited economic liberalisa-
tion and privatisation agendas were captured by powerful political–military–
business groups, which distorted them in their own favour (the phenomenon of 
“crony” capitalism). This produced a fertile ground for social frustration and 
disappointment, which eventually led to the social and political explosion in 
2010–2011. 
3.2. Differing economic agendas 
Since the economic legacies of the Arab and Soviet-type socialisms are different, 
Arab countries cannot simply copy the experiences of the post-communist transi-
tion of the early 1990s. True, some economic problems appear to be similar, at 
least at first glance. For example, most Arab economies need to eliminate direct 
and indirect subsidies on domestic food and energy products in order to reduce 
excessive budget deficits (which threaten their macroeconomic stability – see 
Section 3.4), eliminate market distortions, and, sometimes, market shortages. 
They should also replace subsidies with targeted social assistance to those who 
really need support, as has been done in a number of post-communist countries 
(Clements et al. 2013).  
Without a doubt, such difficult reforms involve great political and social risks. 
Nevertheless, their scale seems much smaller than the macroeconomic stabilisa-
tion and price liberalisation agenda implemented in the post-communist coun-
tries. The latter faced severe balance-of-payment crises and high inflation/hy-
perinflation, while the macroeconomic situation of the Arab countries in the late 
2000s was not so turbulent. 
Unfortunately, since 2011, several Arab countries experienced a deterioration, 
sometimes a substantial one, in the macroeconomic sphere (GDP stagnation or 
decline, higher unemployment, larger fiscal deficits, shrinking international re-
serves, etc.) as a result of either violent conflicts (Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq), 
or domestic political instability (Egypt and, to a lesser extent, Tunisia), or insta-
bility in the neighbourhood (Jordan and Lebanon).
As far as external economic relations are concerned, Arab economies must un-
doubtedly become more open, both among themselves (despite the Pan-Arab Free 
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Trade Area, PAFTA, they still have a long way to go) and with the wider world 
(Ghoneim et al. 2012). However, much progress has already been made in this 
sphere since the beginning of the new millennium. Most of the Arab countries are 
WTO members; they concluded free trade agreements among themselves, with 
the EU, and some of them even with the US. Their currencies are already convert-
ible for current account transaction purposes (Dabrowski – De Wulf 2013). 
Privatisation policies will also differ because there is less to privatise in Arab 
countries as compared to the post-communist countries in the early 1990s. First, 
as mentioned above, nationalisation in the Arab world was never as extensive as 
in the Soviet bloc countries. Second, a substantial part of public ownership in-
volves the oil and gas industries’ assets, which, most likely, will not be the subject 
of outright privatisation for political reasons, at least not in the near future (even 
if opening the door to transnational corporations is critically important for de-
veloping new production capacities). Third, most Arab countries already started 
privatising several years ago and some of them, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia, for 
example, made progress in this sphere (Woodward – Safavi 2012). Rather, they 
must now avoid the revolutionary temptation to reverse some of the past privati-
sation deals considered flawed or unfair by the broader public. As demonstrated 
by the experience of Ukraine after the “Orange” Revolution in 2004–2005, such 
a reversal may be devastating for the business and investment climate. Instead, 
the effort should be put to ensure the greater openness, transparency, and fair 
competition of future privatisation deals. 
Finally, privatisation methods will also differ. Most Arab countries have 
functioning capital markets and enjoy access to international financial markets. 
Thus, they can privatise for money, to strategic investors or through initial pub-
lic offerings, and they do not need to give away ownership, for example, in 
the form of artificially invented coupon/voucher programs or heavily leveraged 
employee/management buyout schemes, as was done in several post-communist 
countries. 
On the other hand, the already existing private sector and new prospective en-
trepreneurs should be relieved of the burden of bureaucratic “red tape”, corrup-
tion, and nepotism (see Ghanem 2016b, and Section 4.1). Poor governance and 
various symptoms of “crony” (or “oligarchic”) capitalism is perhaps the most 
serious obstacle to growth in many Arab countries. This makes their problems 
similar to those currently experienced by some FSU and Balkan countries rather 
than to the early post-communist transition agenda. That is, they are like Russia 
or Ukraine, for instance, which managed to build the foundations of a market 
economy, but failed to ensure its fair and effective functioning. 
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3.3. Deterioration of the economic situation since 2008
The global financial crisis of 2008–2009, followed by the European sovereign 
debt and financial crisis of 2010–2013, hit hard most of CEE and FSU economies 
(Table 2) because of their dependence on trade with, and capital flows from, ad-
vanced economies, especially Western and Northern Europe. Both crises had but 
a limited and brief impact on Arab economies because of their moderate trade and 
financial exposure to Europe and because of the continuous oil and commodity 
boom in 2010–2013. However, Arab economies have been damaged by political 
destabilisation and violent conflicts in the region since 2011. Business activity, 
investment, and incoming tourism, an important industry in Lebanon, Jordan, 
Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria (Languar 2011, 2012) have suffered. In addition, since 
2014, oil-exporting countries, in particular the Gulf countries, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, 
and Algeria, have been negatively affected by the sharp decline in oil prices. 
The fear of spreading popular unrest made most Arab governments reluctant 
to continue economic reforms such as the reduction or elimination of subsidies, 
public sector modernisation and restructuring, privatisation, and bringing foreign 
investors. Worse, reacting to mass protests in 2010–2011 in a populist way, sev-
eral governments backtracked on previous reforms by increasing energy and food 
subsidies again, increasing public sector employment, or revising previous priva-
tisation deals, to mention a few examples. 
The adverse impact of political events on economic growth in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, and Yemen is clearly visible in Table 3. The negative economic and politi-
cal fallout from the civil wars in Syria (since 2011) and Iraq (since 2014) such as 
large numbers of refugees, blocked transit routes, declining tourism, and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flows affected neighbouring Lebanon, Jordan, and Tur-
key (IMF 2013, Box 2.1, pp. 34–35). Similarly, conflict in Libya has negatively 
affected neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt. 
The IMF World Economic Outlook data on Syria after 2010 are not avail-
able. However, Abu-Ismail (2016) estimates that Syria’s GDP contracted by 55% 
between 2010 and 2015. Cumulative destruction in housing and infrastructure 
stock amounted to ca. 150% of 2010 GDP. The total cultivated area in agriculture 
declined by 60% and the primary school enrolment ratio fell to 60%. Neither did 
the situation in Syria help Jordan and Lebanon to return to higher growth rates. 
Since 2011, fiscal balances deteriorated everywhere in the region, even in oil-
producing Algeria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan as well as in Jordan and 
Morocco, which were not affected directly by the mass protests resulting in civil 
wars (Khan 2016). Egypt recorded high fiscal deficits since at least the early 
2000s, which have deteriorated further since 2010. 
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Table 2. Post-communist economies: real GDP, annual change, %, 2007–2015
Group Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EU new
member
states
Bulgaria 6.9 5.8 –5.0 0.7 2.0 0.5 1.1 1.7 1.7
Croatia 5.2 2.1 –7.4 –1.7 –0.3 –2.2 –1.1 –0.4 0.8
Czech Republic 5.5 2.7 –4.8 2.3 2.0 –0.9 –0.5 2.0 3.9
Estonia 7.7 –5.4 –14.7 2.5 7.6 5.2 1.6 2.9 2.0
Hungary 0.5 0.9 –6.6 0.8 1.8 –1.5 1.5 3.6 3.0
Latvia 9.8 –3.2 –14.2 –2.9 5.0 4.8 4.2 2.4 2.2
Lithuania 11.1 2.6 –14.8 1.6 6.1 3.8 3.3 3.0 1.8
Poland 7.2 3.9 2.6 3.7 4.8 1.8 1.7 3.4 3.5
Romania 6.9 8.5 –7.1 –0.8 1.1 0.6 3.4 2.8 3.4
Slovakia 10.7 5.4 –5.3 4.8 2.7 1.6 1.4 2.4 3.2
Slovenia 6.9 3.3 –7.8 1.2 0.6 –2.7 –1.1 3.0 2.3
EU
candidates/
potential 
candidates
Albania 5.9 7.5 3.4 3.7 2.5 1.6 1.4 1.9 2.7
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 6.0 5.6 –2.7 0.8 1.0 –1.2 2.5 1.1 2.1
Kosovo 8.3 4.5 3.6 3.3 4.4 2.8 3.4 2.7 3.2
Macedonia 6.5 5.5 –0.4 3.4 2.3 –0.5 2.7 3.8 3.2
Montenegro 10.7 6.9 –5.7 2.5 3.2 –2.5 3.3 1.5 3.2
Serbia 5.9 5.4 –3.1 0.6 1.4 –1.0 2.6 –1.8 0.5
FSU 
countries
Armenia 13.7 6.9 –14.2 2.2 4.7 7.1 3.5 3.4 2.5
Azerbaijan 25.0 10.8 9.3 5.0 0.1 2.2 5.8 2.8 4.0
Belarus 8.7 10.3 0.1 7.7 5.5 1.7 1.0 1.6 –3.6
Georgia 12.6 2.6 –3.7 6.2 7.2 6.4 3.3 4.8 2.0
Kazakhstan 8.9 3.3 1.2 7.3 7.5 5.0 6.0 4.3 1.5
Kyrgyzstan 8.5 7.6 2.9 –0.5 6.0 –0.9 10.5 3.6 2.0
Moldova 3.0 7.8 –6.0 7.1 6.8 –0.7 9.4 4.6 –1.0
Russia 8.5 5.2 –7.8 4.5 4.3 3.4 1.3 0.6 –3.8
Tajikistan 7.8 7.9 3.9 6.5 7.4 7.5 7.4 6.7 3.0
Turkmenistan 11.1 14.7 6.1 9.2 14.7 11.1 10.2 10.3 8.5
Ukraine 8.2 2.2 –15.1 0.3 5.5 0.2 0.0 –6.8 –9.0
Uzbekistan 9.5 9.0 8.1 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.0 8.1 6.8
Note: Bold numbers indicate IMF estimate.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, October 2015.
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Table 3. Basic macroeconomic indicators in selected Arab countries, 2007–2015
Country Indicator 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
A
lg
er
ia
Annual growth of real GDP, % 3.4 2.4 1.6 3.6 2.8 2.6 2.8 3.8 3.0
End-of-year inflation, % 4.8 4.9 5.8 2.7 5.2 9.0 1.1 5.3 2.0
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP 6.1 9.1 –5.5 –0.4 –0.4 –4.1 –0.4 –7.3 –13.7
GG gross debt, % of GDP 13.9 8.8 10.8 11.7 9.9 9.9 8.3 8.8 10.2
Current account balance, 
% of GDP 22.7 20.1 0.3 7.5 9.9 5.9 0.4 –4.5 –17.7
B
ah
ra
in
Annual growth of real GDP, % 8.3 6.2 2.5 4.3 2.1 3.6 5.3 4.5 3.4
End-of-year inflation, % 4.0 5.1 1.6 1.0 0.2 2.6 4.0 2.5 1.6
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP 1.6 4.3 –5.6 –5.8 –1.5 –3.2 –4.3 –5.7 –14.2
GG gross debt, % of GDP 16.3 12.6 21.4 29.7 32.5 36.2 43.5 43.8 66.7
Current account balance, 
% of GDP 13.4 8.8 2.4 3.0 11.2 7.2 7.8 3.3 –4.8
D
jib
ou
ti
Annual growth of real GDP, % 5.1 5.8 5.0 3.5 4.5 4.8 5.0 6.0 6.5
End-of-year inflation, % 8.2 9.2 2.2 2.8 7.6 1.1 2.5 2.8 3.0
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP –2.6 1.2 –5.2 –1.3 –1.4 –2.7 –5.9 –10.5 –11.5
GG gross debt, % of GDP 56.7 59.3 57.6 50.6 45.2 43.3 42.3 43.2 52.4
Current account balance, 
% of GDP –21.4 –24.3 –9.3 0.6 –13.7 –20.3 –23.3 –25.6 –31.4
Eg
yp
t
Annual growth of real GDP, % 7.1 7.2 4.7 5.1 1.8 2.2 2.1 2.2 4.2
End-of-year inflation, % 8.6 19.9 9.9 10.6 11.8 7.3 9.8 8.2 11.4
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP –7.5 –8.0 –6.9 –8.3 –9.8 –10.5 –14.1 –13.6 –11.7
GG gross debt, % of GDP 80.2 70.2 73.0 73.2 76.6 78.9 89.0 90.5 90.0
Current account balance, 
% of GDP 2.1 0.5 –2.3 –2.0 –2.6 –3.9 –2.4 –0.8 –3.7
Ir
aq
Annual growth of real GDP, % 1.9 8.2 3.4 6.4 7.5 13.9 6.6 –2.1 0.0
End-of-year inflation, % 4.7 6.8 –4.4 3.3 6.0 3.6 3.1 1.6 3.0
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP 7.8 –0.9 –12.7 –4.2 4.7 4.1 –5.8 –5.3 –23.1
GG gross debt, % of GDP 117.1 74.2 87.4 53.6 40.8 34.7 31.9 38.9 75.7
Current account balance, 
% of GDP 0.8 15.9 –6.8 3.0 12.0 6.7 1.3 –2.8 –12.7
Jo
rd
an
Annual growth of real GDP, % 8.2 7.2 5.5 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.8 3.1 2.9
End-of-year inflation, % 5.1 9.0 2.7 5.7 2.9 6.0 3.1 1.7 1.9
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP –5.0 –4.4 –8.9 –5.6 –6.8 –8.9 –11.5 –10.0 –3.0
GG gross debt, % of GDP 77.4 60.2 64.8 67.1 70.7 81.8 86.7 89.0 90.0
Current account balance, 
% of GDP –16.8 –9.4 –5.2 –7.1 –10.3 –15.2 –10.3 –6.8 –7.4
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Table 3. continued
Country Indicator 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
K
uw
ai
t
Annual growth of real GDP, % 6.0 2.5 –7.1 –2.4 10.6 7.7 0.8 0.1 1.2
End-of-year inflation, % 7.5 9.0 2.1 6.0 3.1 4.4 2.7 2.9 3.3
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP 37.4 20.2 27.2 25.9 33.0 34.7 34.0 26.3 1.3
GG gross debt, % of GDP 11.8 9.6 11.0 11.3 8.5 6.8 6.4 6.9 9.9
Current account balance, 
% of GDP 36.8 40.9 26.7 31.8 42.7 45.2 41.2 31.0 9.3
Le
ba
no
n
Annual growth of real GDP, % 9.4 9.1 10.3 8.0 0.9 2.8 2.5 2.0 2.0
End-of-year inflation, % 6.0 6.4 3.4 4.6 3.1 10.1 1.1 –0.7 1.0
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP –11.0 –10.0 –8.2 –7.6 –5.9 –8.4 –8.7 –6.0 –10.0
GG gross debt, % of GDP 171.0 163.1 145.6 138.4 133.9 130.8 133.4 133.1 132.4
Current account balance, 
% of GDP –7.2 –11.1 –12.5 –20.7 –15.1 –24.3 –26.7 –24.9 –21.0
Li
by
a
Annual growth of real GDP, % 6.4 2.7 –0.8 5.0 –62.1 104.5 –13.6 –24.0 –6.1
End-of-year inflation, % 7.6 9.7 0.3 3.3 26.6 –3.7 1.7 3.7 11.7
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP 28.6 27.5 –5.3 11.6 –15.9 27.8 –4.0 –43.5 –79.1
GG gross debt, % of GDP 4.1 1.0 1.9 1.6 10.9 2.3 3.3 39.3 50.5
Current account balance, 
% of GDP 44.1 42.5 14.9 19.5 9.1 29.1 13.6 –30.1 –62.2
M
au
rit
an
ia
Annual growth of real GDP, % 2.8 1.1 –1.0 4.8 4.4 6.0 5.5 6.9 4.1
End-of-year inflation, % 7.4 3.9 4.9 6.1 5.5 3.4 4.5 4.7 3.6
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP –1.8 –4.3 –3.1 –0.6 0.0 2.5 –0.9 –3.6 –1.0
GG gross debt, % of GDP 76.4 78.8 90.9 80.3 73.3 73.2 76.4 76.6 84.3
Current account balance, 
% of GDP –14.5 –13.2 –13.4 –7.6 –6.0 –26.6 –24.4 –28.9 –18.3
M
or
oc
co
Annual growth of real GDP, % 3.5 5.9 4.2 3.8 5.2 3.0 4.7 2.4 4.9
End-of-year inflation, % 2.0 4.2 –1.6 2.2 0.9 2.6 0.4 1.6 1.6
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP –0.1 0.7 –1.8 –4.3 –6.6 –7.3 –5.2 –4.9 –4.3
GG gross debt, % of GDP 52.0 45.4 46.1 49.0 52.5 58.3 61.5 63.4 63.9
Current account balance, 
% of GDP –2.5 –7.1 –5.3 –4.4 –7.9 –9.5 –7.9 –5.5 –2.3
O
m
an
Annual growth of real GDP, % 4.5 8.2 6.1 4.8 4.1 5.8 4.7 2.9 4.4
End-of-year inflation, % 8.3 11.8 0.9 4.2 3.3 2.9 0.3 1.0 0.4
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP 12.4 17.3 –0.3 5.7 9.4 4.7 3.2 –1.5 –17.7
GG gross debt, % of GDP 7.1 4.8 6.9 5.9 5.2 4.9 5.1 5.1 9.3
Current account balance, 
% of GDP 6.0 8.5 –1.1 8.9 13.2 10.3 6.6 2.0 –16.9
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Table 3. continued
Country Indicator 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Q
at
ar
Annual growth of real GDP, % 18.0 17.7 12.0 19.6 13.4 4.9 4.6 4.0 4.7
End-of-year inflation, % 13.6 15.2 –4.9 0.4 2.1 2.6 2.5 2.9 1.6
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP 10.4 10.8 15.5 6.1 10.2 14.2 20.7 14.7 4.5
GG gross debt, % of GDP 8.0 11.5 33.6 38.4 34.5 36.0 32.3 31.7 29.9
Current account balance, 
% of GDP 14.4 23.1 6.5 19.1 30.7 32.6 30.9 26.1 5.0
Sa
ud
i A
ra
bi
a
Annual growth of real GDP, % 6.0 8.4 1.8 4.8 10.0 5.4 2.7 3.5 3.4
End-of-year inflation, % 6.0 9.5 4.0 5.8 2.7 3.6 3.0 2.4 2.1
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP 11.8 29.8 –5.4 3.6 11.2 12.0 5.8 –3.4 –21.6
GG gross debt, % of GDP 17.1 12.1 14.0 8.4 5.4 3.6 2.2 1.6 6.7
Current account balance, 
% of GDP 22.5 25.5 4.9 12.7 23.7 22.4 18.2 10.3 –3.5
Su
da
n
Annual growth of real GDP, % 8.5 3.0 4.7 3.0 –1.3 –3.4 3.9 3.6 3.5
End-of-year inflation, % 8.8 14.9 15.5 15.4 18.9 44.4 41.9 25.7 15.5
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP –3.5 0.6 –5.1 0.3 0.1 –3.3 –2.3 –1.1 –1.8
GG gross debt, % of GDP 70.7 68.8 72.1 73.1 70.6 94.8 89.9 74.0 71.5
Current account balance, 
% of GDP –6.0 –1.6 –9.6 –2.1 –0.4 –9.3 –8.9 –7.7 –5.8
Sy
ria
Annual growth of real GDP, % 5.7 4.5 5.9 3.4 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
End-of-year inflation, % 4.8 15.4 1.7 6.3 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP –3.0 –2.9 –2.9 –7.8 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
GG gross debt, % of GDP 42.7 37.3 31.2 30.0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Current account balance, 
% of GDP –0.2 –1.3 –2.9 –2.8 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Tu
ni
si
a
Annual growth of real GDP, % 6.3 4.5 3.1 2.6 –1.9 3.7 2.3 2.3 1.0
End-of-year inflation, % 3.9 4.4 3.3 3.3 3.9 5.9 5.7 4.8 4.4
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP –2.6 –0.7 –2.4 –0.5 –3.2 –4.8 –6.0 –3.7 –5.7
GG gross debt, % of GDP 45.9 43.3 42.8 40.7 44.5 44.5 44.3 50.0 54.0
Current account balance, 
% of GDP –2.4 –3.8 –2.8 –4.8 –7.5 –8.2 –8.3 –8.8 –8.5
U
A
E
Annual growth of real GDP, % 3.2 3.2 –5.2 1.6 4.9 7.2 4.3 4.6 3.0
End-of-year inflation, % 11.7 6.6 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.7 3.0 3.3
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP 21.8 20.1 –4.3 2.0 6.3 10.9 10.4 5.0 –5.5
GG gross debt, % of GDP 7.9 12.5 24.1 22.2 17.6 17.0 15.9 15.7 18.9
Current account balance, 
% of GDP 12.5 7.1 3.1 2.5 14.7 21.3 18.4 13.7 2.9
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Since 2014, the government revenues of Arab oil exporters suffered from a 
sharp decline in oil prices, similarly to oil producers in other regions (including 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in the FSU). On 
the contrary, the budgets of oil importers should benefit from lower oil prices due 
to lower energy subsidies and lower government expenditures. However, the net 
lending/borrowing statistics in Table 3 do not confirm such fiscal gains yet. 
The combination of slower growth and higher fiscal deficits led to an increase 
in gross general government (GG) debt-to-GDP ratio in Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen. Until 2013, net oil exporters, except Bahrain and 
Sudan, were able to either decrease this ratio or stabilise it on a low level. How-
ever, since 2014, it started to grow in Algeria, Iraq, and Libya as a result of lower 
oil prices and military conflicts (Iraq and Libya). 
Gross public debt reached a high level in some Arab countries as compared 
to other emerging market economies. In 2014, it amounted to 133.1% of GDP in 
Lebanon, 90.5% of GDP in Egypt, 89.0% in Jordan, 76.6% in Mauritania, 74.0% 
in Sudan, and 63.4% in Morocco. 
Fiscal imbalances and consumption-related subsidies put pressure on exter-
nal accounts. The data in Table 3 point to two waves of deterioration of current 
account balances: since 2011 in Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco (in Jordan and 
Morocco they improved somewhat after 2013) and since 2014, as a result of the 
oil-price shock (in Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE). 
Djibouti, Lebanon, and Mauritania recorded extremely high current account defi-
cits (between 20 and 30% of GDP) for several years.
Capital accounts also deteriorated due to decreasing inflows of FDI and, in 
some cases, to capital outflows in countries affected directly (Egypt, Iraq, Libya, 
Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen) or indirectly (Jordan and Lebanon) by the negative 
consequences of the Arab Uprising. 
Table 3. continued
Country Indicator 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Ye
m
en
Annual growth of real GDP, % 3.3 3.6 3.9 7.7 -12.7 2.4 4.8 –0.2 –28.1
End-of-year inflation, % 11.2 10.8 8.8 12.5 23.2 5.8 8.1 10.0 20.0
GG net lending/borrowing, 
% of GDP –7.2 –4.5 –10.2 –4.1 –4.5 –6.3 –6.9 –4.1 –8.5
GG gross debt, % of GDP 40.4 36.4 49.8 42.4 45.7 47.3 48.2 48.7 67.0
Current account balance, 
% of GDP –7.0 –4.7 –10.1 -3.4 –3.0 –1.7 –3.1 –1.7 –5.3
Notes: GG – General government. Bold numbers indicate IMF estimate.
Source: IMF WEO database, October 2015.
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The negative balance-of-payment trends had their impact on gross interna-
tional reserves (Table 4). Since 2011, they decreased in Egypt (despite support 
provided by the Gulf countries) and Tunisia (despite the IMF program) and, al-
beit temporarily (2012), in Jordan and Morocco. In turn, the oil-price decline in 
2014–2015 led to a decrease in the gross international reserves of Algeria, Iraq, 
Libya, and Saudi Arabia. 
Overall, the importance of fiscal and macroeconomic adjustment is increasing 
over time and, if further postponed, it may become even more painful. None-
theless, the expected scale of adjustment remains incomparably smaller than in 
the former communist economies of the 1990s. Likewise, several CEE and FSU 
economies, for example Slovenia, Hungary, Serbia, Poland, Croatia, Ukraine, 
and FSU oil producers, must also tighten their fiscal policies to eliminate exces-
sive deficits and constrain growing public debt-to-GDP ratios. 
Table 4. Total international reserves, without gold, in selected Arab countries, USD bn, 
end of period, 2009–2015
Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015Q2
Algeria 149.04 162.61 182.82 191.30 194.71 179.62 159.58
Bahrain 3.85 5.09 4.54 5.20 5.35 6.05 5.76
Comoros 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.17 n/a
Djibouti 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.42 0.39 0.38
Egypt 32.25 33.61 14.92 11.63 13.61 12.00 16.70
Iraq 44.13 50.36 60.74 68.73 76.11 62.89 n/a
Jordan 11.69 13.06 11.47 8.09 13.22 15.30 15.05
Kuwait 20.27 21.24 25.80 28.89 29.35 32.11 32.55
Lebanon 29.10 31.51 33.74 37.19 36.75 39.55 40.55
Libya 98.73 99.65 104.80 118.41 115.20 89.09 81.42
Mauritania 0.23 0.27 0.48 0.95 n/a n/a n/a
Morocco 22.80 22.61 19.53 16.36 18.40 19.67 19.76
Oman 12.20 13.02 14.37 14.40 15.95 16.32 19.21
Palestine 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.66 0.69 0.67 0.63
Qatar 18.37 30.62 16.20 32.52 41.60 42.73 n/a
Saudi Arabia 409.69 444.72 540.68 656.46 725.29 731.92 671.67
Sudan 1.09 1.04 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 n/a
Syria 17.40 19.47 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Tunisia 11.06 9.46 7.45 8.36 7.29 7.24 n/a
UAE 26.10 32.79 37.27 47.04 68.20 78.42 75.75
Yemen 6.94 5.87 4.45 6.07 5.28 n/a n/a
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
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3.4. The subsidy challenge 
The biggest macroeconomic and structural policy challenge in the Arab region 
relates to generalised price subsidies on food and energy (Bergasse et al. 2013), 
which continue to absorb, directly or indirectly, large public resources, especially 
in Iraq, Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, Oman, 
Jordan, and the UAE. Most of this burden relates to energy subsidies, i.e. subsi-
dies on petroleum, electricity, natural gas, and coal. The cost of food subsidies 
is relatively smaller: it amounted to 0.7% of GDP in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region according to IMF estimates (2013, Box 2.4, p. 42). How-
ever, in some countries (Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt), it was higher, i.e. in the range 
of between 1 and 2% of GDP. 
Consumer subsidies can be measured in two ways: as pre-tax subsidies and 
post-tax subsidies (see Clement et al. 2013 for details). Pre-tax subsidies are de-
fined as the difference between the value of the supplied products and services at 
either international prices (tradable goods) or cost-recovery prices (non-tradable 
goods) and the domestic prices paid by their consumers, both final and interme-
diate. Post-tax subsidies are the sum of pre-tax and tax subsidies. The latter are 
measured as the difference between the efficient taxation that takes sufficient 
account of externalities (in the case of energy, for example, this is the environ-
mental impact of its production and consumption) and actual one. 
The IMF (2013, Box 2.4, p. 42) estimated the total cost of pre-tax energy sub-
sidies in MENA at the level of USD 236.7 billion, i.e. 8.6% of their GDP and 22% 
of GG revenue in 2011. About half of this amount was absorbed by subsidies on 
diesel and gasoline. In global comparison, MENA appeared as the region with the 
highest energy subsidies, which constituted almost half of the total pre-tax world 
energy subsidies in 2011. If one added implicit tax subsidies, the total post-tax 
energy subsidies in MENA would approach 15% of GDP. 
Generalised consumer subsidies are usually the consequence of government 
price controls. If the government controls prices on either energy products or 
food, they become almost automatically “politicised”; their upward adjustment 
may provoke social and political tensions. When necessity for such adjustments 
comes as a result, for example, of higher international prices, the depreciation of 
national currency, domestic inflation, etc., the government usually tries to delay 
setting new higher prices and, consequently, creates a gap between the admin-
istratively fixed price and the international or cost-recovery price. When such a 
gap becomes large, there is even less political readiness to close it. Eventually it 
must happen and, in case of a delay, adjustment becomes more painful socially, 
politically, and economically. 
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This was exactly the experience of the former communist economies, which 
led to their severe macroeconomic crises at the onset of the transition (late 1980s 
and early 1990s). This historical lesson was taken seriously in the next two dec-
ades: CEE and FSU countries deregulated most of the prices, eliminated subsi-
dies, and replaced them by targeted social assistance where needed. There are 
few exceptions: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and, to a lesser extent, Kyrgyzstan 
(electricity), Ukraine (natural gas and municipal utilities), and Belarus (electric-
ity, natural gas and municipal utilities – IMF 2015a). 
Universal price subsidies are both costly and inefficient as tools to fight pov-
erty (their main social policy justification). In reality, higher- and middle-income 
groups are the main beneficiaries of these subsidies (Bergasse et al. 2013; Clem-
ent at al. 2013). In addition, the subsidies have a devastating microeconomic and 
structural impact. They discourage producers of the subsidised energy and food 
products from increasing their output and quality parameters. They stimulate ex-
cessive and wasteful consumption, damage the environment, and hamper the de-
velopment of renewable energy, etc. 
Figure 1. Pre-tax energy subsidies and spending on education in MENA countries, in % of GDP
Notes: Energy subsidies refer to 2011; education refers to the latest available data (in brackets).
Source: Clement et al. (2013), Appendix Table 2, p. 50; World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
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By absorbing a substantial share of fiscal resources (half of its GG revenue 
in the case of Egypt, and between 20 and 30% in the case of Algeria, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Libya), energy and food subsidies crowd out other important ex-
penditures, for example, for education which creates an important development 
bottleneck in the region. Figure 1 shows that public spending on education is 
much lower than energy subsidies in most MENA countries except for Tunisia, 
Mauritania, Sudan, Morocco, and Djibouti. The decrease in international prices 
of oil and other energy resources in 2014–2015 created a unique opportunity to 
eliminate subsidies with less dramatic price adjustments. 
4. LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENTAL CHALLENGES
4.1. Common challenges
Looking at the long-term social and economic challenges, one can also find both 
similarities and differences between the two regions (CEE/FSU and Arab countries). 
For example, both the resource-rich FSU economies and Arab hydrocarbon 
producers must decrease their dependence on world commodity prices (and their 
impact on fiscal accounts and real exchange rate), make progress in the structural 
diversification of their economies, and decrease income and wealth inequalities. 
They should also use huge resource rents for the long-term benefit of the entire 
population rather than for consolidating authoritarian power and conducting popu-
list policies. On the other hand, low- and lower-middle-income countries in both 
regions face challenges of continuous poverty, poor infrastructure and social serv-
ices, the underdevelopment of the financial sector, large outgoing migration, etc. 
Several Arab, FSU, and Western Balkanic countries suffer from the deficit 
of economic freedom and poor business climate as illustrated by Table 5, which 
presents the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (HFIEF) 2014. 
This is one of the global synthetic indexes, which measures simultaneously prop-
erty rights, corruption, size of government and taxation, business regulations, 
labour market flexibility, monetary stability, trade and investment regulations, 
and financial freedom. 
There is no economically “free” country in either of the two regions, i.e. hav-
ing a score of at least 80 or more.5 The next category, called “mostly free” (MF, 
scores between 70.0 and 79.9), was represented by two Baltic countries (Estonia 
and Lithuania), the Czech Republic and Georgia in the CEE/FSU region, and 
5  There were only six such countries in the world: Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, New Zea-
land, Switzerland, and Canada.
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Table 5. HF Index of Economic Freedom 2014 in CEE/FSU and Arab countries
Region Country World Rank 2014 Score Category
CEE/FSU
Albania 54 66.9 ModF
Armenia 41 68.9 ModF
Azerbaijan 81 61.3 ModF
Belarus 150 50.1 MU
Bosnia & Herzegovina 101 58.4 MU
Bulgaria 61 65.7 ModF
Croatia 87 60.4 ModF
Czech Republic 26 72.2 MF
Estonia 11 75.9 MF
Georgia 22 72.6 MF
Hungary 51 67.0 ModF
Kazakhstan 67 63.7 ModF
Kyrgyzstan 85 61.1 ModF
Latvia 42 68.7 ModF
Lithuania 21 73.0 MF
Macedonia 43 68.6 ModF
Moldova 110 57.3 MU
Montenegro 68 63.6 ModF
Poland 50 67.0 ModF
Romania 62 65.5 ModF
Russia 140 51.9 MU
Serbia 95 59.4 MU
Slovakia 57 66.4 ModF
Slovenia 74 62.7 ModF
Tajikistan 139 52.0 MU
Turkmenistan 171 42.2 R
Ukraine 155 49.3 R
Uzbekistan 163 46.5 R
Arab 
countries
Algeria 146 50.8 MU
Bahrain 13 75.1 MF
Comoros 142 51.4 MU
Djibouti 118 55.9 MU
Egypt 135 52.9 MU
Jordan 39 69.2 ModF
Kuwait 76 62.3 ModF
Lebanon 96 59.4 MU
Mauritania 134 53.2 MU
Morocco 103 58.3 MU
Oman 48 67.4 ModF
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three small Gulf countries (Bahrain, Qatar, and UAE) in the Arab region. There 
were 15 “moderately free” (ModF, scores between 60.0 and 69.9) economies in 
the CEE/FSU region and four such Arab economies. Six CEE/FSU economies 
and 9 Arab economies belonged to the “mostly unfree” category (MU, scores 
between 50.0 and 50.9). Finally, three FSU countries (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
and Ukraine) were classified as “repressed” (R, scores below 50). 
Six countries – Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria – were not 
ranked, but most of them represented an extremely poor business environment 
due to security problems. 
4.2. Challenges specifi c to Arab countries
Arab countries face some specific development challenges, which make them 
more similar to other developing countries rather than to post-communist econo-
mies. 
Part of these specific challenges originates from a lower level of economic de-
velopment of the Arab world as compared to CEE and FSU countries. As seen in 
Figure 2, the average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita measured in pur-
chasing power parity (PPP) terms in the MENA region (which includes all high-
income Gulf economies) was lower than in CEE (without high-income Slovenia, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Estonia) and FSU in 20106. 
Among other challenges, several Arab countries continue to suffer from high 
levels of illiteracy (Table 6), especially in Mauritania, Yemen, Sudan, Morocco, 
Algeria, Egypt, Comoros, Iraq, and Tunisia. The continuous illiteracy among 
youth (15–24-year-olds) means that large groups of girls and, to a lesser extent, 
boys remain excluded even from primary education. 
6 We chose the year 2010 for comparison to illustrate the situation before the Arab Uprising. 
Table 5. continued
Region Country World Rank 2014 Score Category
Arab 
countries
Qatar 30 71.2 MF
Saudi Arabia 77 62.2 ModF
Tunisia 109 57.3 MU
UAE 28 71.4 MF
Yemen 123 55.5 MU
Notes: MF – mostly free, ModF – moderately free, MU – mostly unfree, R – repressed.
Source: http://www.heritage.org/index/excel/2014/index2014_data.xls
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Figure 2. GDP per capita in PPP terms, current international dollars, 2010
Notes: The CEE subregion includes Turkey, but does not include Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and 
Slovakia that are considered as “advanced” economies in the IMF WEO country grouping; FSU includes 
Georgia and Mongolia; MENA includes Iran, but does not include Comoros, Somalia, and Palestine.
Source: IMF WEO database, April 2012.
Table 6. Literacy rates in Arab countries, compared to the worst-performing post-communist 
country (Albania), in % of respective population age group
Country Adult total >15 Young female 15–24 Young male 15–24
Algeria (2006) 72.6 89.1 94.4
Bahrain (2010) 94.6 97.6 98.6
Comoros (2011) 75.5 85.9 86.1
Egypt (2012) 73.9 86.1 92.4
Iraq (2011) 78.5 80.5 84.1
Jordan (2011) 95.9 99.3 99.1
Kuwait (2008) 93.9 98.7 98.6
Lebanon (2007) 89.6 99.1 98.4
Libya (2011) 89.5 99.9 99.9
Mauritania (2011) 58.6 66.2 71.6
Morocco (2011) 67.1 74.0 88.8
Oman (2010) 86.9 98.2 97.4
Palestine (2011) 95.3 99.4 99.3
Qatar (2010) 96.3 98.3 96.3
Saudi Arabia (2011) 87.2 97.0 99.0
Sudan (2011) 71.9 84.5 89.9
Syria (2011) 84.1 94.1 96.4
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Furthermore, most of those who have access to schools complete only a pri-
mary education or less. Moroccan and Syrian children are particularly disadvan-
taged with the average schooling period of ca. five years (Arbak 2012). The qual-
ity of education, apart from a very small number of elite schools and universities, 
is rather low (AHDR 2003), which is documented, among others, by outdated 
curricula and teaching methods (Ghanem 2016b), high level of teacher absentee-
ism (Devarajan 2016), and poor results in international student tests (El Mahdi 
et al. 2011). Consequently, the quality of human capital in the region is below its 
potential, with negative consequences for economic development. 
The shortcomings of the education system have a negative impact on the la-
bour market situation in the region, in particular, the exceptionally high level of 
youth unemployment (Devarajan 2016) and the low participation rate of female 
labour force (Table 7). 
Table 6. continued
Country Adult total >15 Young female 15–24 Young male 15–24
Tunisia (2010) 79.1 96.1 98.2
UAE (2005) 90.0 97.0 93.6
Yemen (2011) 65.3 76.0 96.4
Arab World (2011) 75.2 84.5 91.4
Albania (2011) 96.8 98.9 98.7
Source: World Development Indicators database (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator).
Table 7. Indicators of gender inequality in selected Arab countries
Country Population with at least secondary 
education, age 25+ (%), 2010
Labour force participation rate (%), 
2008
Female Male Female Male
Algeria 36.3 49.3 38.2 83.1
Egypt 43.4 61.1 24.4 76.4
Jordan 57.6 73.8 24.7 78.3
Lebanon .. .. 24.1 74.8
Libya 55.6 44.0 25.1 81.1
Morocco 20.1 36.4 28.7 83.6
Palestine .. .. 16.7 72.4
Syria 24.7 24.1 22.0 82.1
Tunisia 33.5 48.0 27.7 74.2
Source: El Laithy (2012).
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Discrimination against women in the socio-economic and political spheres 
poses another serious challenge (El Laithy 2012). These strongly interlinked 
problems (poor education, low labour force participation rate, and gender ine-
quality) must remain at the top of reform agendas in Arab countries. The ability 
to resolve them will determine the future paths of social, economic, and political 
development in the region.
5. LESSONS TO BE LEARNT
Even if the starting conditions, agendas, and the course of the transition in the 
former Soviet bloc and the Arab world have differed, there are some common 
lessons to be learnt from both regions. In many instances, they can also be rein-
forced by the experiences of political and economic transitions in other regions. 
The first lesson tells us that democratisation may prompt economic reform and 
growth (Devarajan 2016), but this is not automatically guaranteed. Much depends 
on the ability of young democracies to generate a stable government, backed by a 
solid parliamentary majority, and their ability to address the country’s economic 
and social challenges swiftly, even if it means taking unpopular measures. If, in-
stead, democratisation produces political instability, decision-making chaos, and 
populist policies, not only economic stability, but political freedom itself will 
come under threat. There are many examples of democracy failures all over the 
world, which ultimately lead to a new wave of authoritarianism, including the 
so-called “colour revolutions” in the former USSR in the mid-2000s and Egypt 
in 2011–2013. This is the real risk faced by all emerging Arab democracies now 
and in the future. 
Second, democratisation must be backed by building institutional checks and 
balances, the rule of law, and an independent but professionally competent and 
impartial judiciary as early as possible. Optimally, it should be done by adopting 
respective constitutional provisions and effective mechanisms of their enforce-
ment. Countries that fail to do so face the risk of an authoritarian backlash, as 
demonstrated by the experience of several FSU and Arab countries. 
This leads us to the third lesson on the timing and speed of reforms: transition 
countries should use the political window of opportunity while it is still open 
and not shelve difficult decisions for the future (Balcerowicz 1994). A broader 
transition experience confirms the importance of reforms speed (Åslund 2002: 
441–456). In both regions, there were cases of missed transition opportunities, 
which led to economic and political failures (for example, Ukraine in 2005–2009, 
Egypt in 2011–2013). Reforms should also be comprehensive to avoid producing 
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intermediate winners with the power to block further changes (Krueger 1993; 
Hellman 1998), which contributes to the phenomenon of “crony” or “oligarchic” 
capitalism. 
The fourth lesson is about the dangers of ethnic and sectarian conflicts; they 
can derail both political and economic transition and trap a country in long-stand-
ing, often bloody, stalemate. This risk already materialised in Syria, Iraq, Libya, 
and Yemen, whose political developments recall the tragic conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia, Caucasus, and Lebanon. Successful conflict resolution could offer a 
substantial peace dividend (Abu-Ismail 2016). 
The fifth lesson refers to the role of external support in consolidating eco-
nomic and political reforms, and making them irreversible. The external leverage 
may provide political and economic incentives, security guarantees, financial 
and technical aid (for the role of EU accession, see Mrak – Rojec 2013). In 
this respect, the history of the post-communist transition is very telling. One 
can distinguish between three groups of countries: (i) CEE countries that, due 
to early offers of EU and NATO membership, now enjoy not only membership 
in both blocks, but are also relatively stable and well-functioning democracies; 
(ii) countries of the former Yugoslavia that underwent a tragic period of ethnic 
conflict in the 1990s, but received EU and NATO membership offers afterwards 
that helped them to consolidate both democratic regimes and market reforms; 
(iii) FSU countries that never received such offers for geopolitical reasons and 
which, on average, have shown the least progress in economic reforms. In the 
political sphere, the situation is even worse because most of them returned to 
autocratic or semi-autocratic regimes. 
Unfortunately, the geopolitical status of Arab countries appears rather more 
akin to that of the FSU countries than to Central Europe: they have no prospect of 
EU and NATO membership. Nevertheless, the EU, the US, and other developing 
countries can support the democratisation process in the Arab world using vari-
ous tools, including deep trade and economic integration and more freedom in 
people-to-people contacts – both of which can play a powerful role. In the case of 
the EU, the potential of such cooperation frameworks as the Barcelona Process, 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the Union for the Mediterranean is far 
from being exploited (European Commission 2015). 
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